CETA: gold standard or greenwashing?

Dr. Wybe Th. Douma

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Topics

- 1) EU goal: promoting sustainable development
- 2) EU practice: trade agreements and SD
- 3) CETA & SD
 - Trade Sustainablity Impact Assesment & ISDS/ICS
 SD chapters
- 4) Concluding remarks

1) EU goal: promoting SD

Integration principle, Art. 11 TFEU

Environmental protection requirements <u>must</u> be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities, in particular with a view to <u>promote sustainable development</u>.

Art. 3(3) TEU: -> internal

The Union ... shall work for the sustainable development in Europe...

Art. 3(5) TEU: -> external

In its relations w. wider world, the Union ... shall contribute to sustainable development of Earth...

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Art. 21(2) TEU: Union policy on international relations goal (f) ensure sustainable development **Art. 21(3) TEU:**

Union respects principles & pursue objectives set out in para 2 in:

- different areas of Union's external action;
- external aspects of its other policies

Union ensures *consistency* between different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies

2) EU practice: trade and SD

1999: DG Trade introduced "Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment" & guidelines on process:

- consultant writes assessment & organizes consultations;
- EC reacts w position paper;
- EU negotiators take findings into account

2008: EU Trade agreements include chapters on Trade and Environment

- Vague norms
- Not enforceable through regular dispute settlement mechanisms, no sanctions

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3) CETA and SD

Aim should be: promote SD in EU trade agreements **CETA negotiation directives:**

- Mention SD in preamble
- Recognise that SD is *overarching objective* of parties So: no promoting / supporting SD, but minimising negative effects on SD

CETA Trade SIA:

- increased trade will lead to more CO2 emissions
- In relationship between EU and Canada, no need for ISDS
- Position paper EC not published after negotiations over

CETA agreement: no specific steps against more CO2 emissions + ISDS (classic); legal scrubbing -> ISDS / ICS

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ISDS - ICS

Annex 8A, Art. 3 CETA: For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance when the impact of a measure or series of measures is so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. -> ICS decides whether, for instance, impact measure(s) against climate change are excessive

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ISDS - ICS

Dutch gov.: over 80 BITs but never a claim against us, no reason to assume CETA will change this.

Yet: existing BITs are with countries in which Dutch invest, they bring claims against 3d countries.

Canadians invest billions in EU & NL, are used to bring ISDS claims: no reason to assume this will differ under CETA, except for some higher hurdles.

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From provisional application to ratification

Provisionally applied since 21 September 2017, except for parts where EU is not exclusively competent: ICS

Ratification hurdles:

- Potentially no majority in Dutch senate
- Resistance in French Senate
- No majority in Cyprus parliament...

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CETA and sustainable development

Chapter 22: Trade and SD

Chapter 23: Trade and labour

Chapter 24: Trade and environment

Example:

Art. 24.5 The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by ... reducing the levels of protection afforded in their environmental law.

-> no ban on reducing proyection levels, only if it can be proven that reduction aims at encouraging trade; hard to prove. NB USMCA: accused party to prove that reason was not encouraging trade.

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CETA and sustainable development

Art. 24.16: no recourse to general dispute settlement rules

Art. 24.15: panel of experts can issue <u>recommendations</u>; party violating rules "shall endeavour ... to identify an appropriate measure"

Dutch government on art. 24.15 = "duty to take measures" Nadere memorie van antwoord EK 2020-2021, 35154, F, Antw op vrg 15 en 16

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Dutch gov: trade and SD provisions in CETA are:

- legally binding
- can be enforced Idem, antw op vrg 21 maar ook 30

Issuing recommendations = enforcement? No sanctions available -> no enforcement in legal sense, merely putting parties under pressure to obey rules SD chapters

NB US Congress vetoed USMCA, demanded stricter SD rules incl. sanctions, inter alia. So parliaments with a spine can achieve improvements even after negotiations are formally over.

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4) Concluding remarks

TSIA guidelines not observed (NB compare EU Ombudsperson on similar issues EU-Mercosur: 'maladministration'

Lack of sanctions in SD chapters:

- So far in practice not serious problem with Canada (?)
- No-go for EU-Mercosur: Bolsonaro not likely to be impressed by recommendation to put halt to deforestation
- Example USMCA shows: better SD provisions exist

Precautionary principle as EU uses it not sufficiently warrented under CETA

Minimising negative effects on SD instead of promoting SD

Conclusion: CETA no gold standard

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Research

- Gouden standard of 'greenwashing'? CETA en het bevorderen van duurzaamheid en milieubescherming via EU handelsverdragen, Milieu & Recht 2018, nr. 6, p. 362-376
- The promotion of Sustainable Development through EU Trade Instruments, European Business Law Review 2017, vol. 28, nr 2, p. 193-212
- Investor-state dispute settlement in EU trade agreements in the light of EU sustainable development policy and law, in:
 L. Pantaleo, M. Andenas, C. Contartese and M. Happold (eds.), 'The EU external action in international economic law', The Hague, 2018
- The limits to precaution in international trade law: from WTO law to EU trade agreements, in: Squintani a.o. (eds.), 2019

Further information

Twitter: @EurEnvlLaw / @WybeDouma

w.t.douma@gmail.com

Thank you for your attention!

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